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Verity Winship* 
Teaching Federal Corporate Law 
U.S. corporate law is usually considered to be rooted in state common law, 
with securities regulation as its federal counterpart.1 The traditional law school 
curriculum mirrors this division. However, a changing economic environment and 
new regulations put pressure on these categories. This essay proposes one way to 
integrate responses to the financial crises into the way lawyers are trained: through 
a course in federal corporate law.2 
A rich literature addresses the federalization of corporate law, much of which 
laments the encroachment on traditionally state law areas.3 What I suggest here is 
that federal corporate law is productively viewed more expansively, as not limited 
to securities regulation. Instead it encompasses a diverse and growing set of 
categories, including such hotly contested topics as federal regulation of executive 
compensation, federal criminal liability for corporations, and federal corporate 
charters. Moreover, a federal corporate law course makes a first cut at better 
aligning the traditional state common law focus of corporate law with the mix of 
corporate law sources encountered in practice. 
Corporate law federalism is an undercurrent even in the basic business 
associations course, but a focus on federal corporate law allows explicit discussion 
of this structure. The backdrop is the U.S. tradition of regulating corporate 
governance at the state level, reflected in strong Supreme Court language to that 
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 1. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 667 
(1974) ("In general, the controls that emerged can be labeled as securities regulation (at the federal level) as 
distinguished from corporate law (at the state level)."); E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The 
Irony of the Twists and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 43 (2009) (describing the traditional division 
between “federal disclosure regulation” and “state primacy over internal corporate affairs”). 
 2. Many of the observations and materials cited in this essay are based on the federal corporate law 
seminar I taught at the University of Illinois Law School in Fall 2010.  
 3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 
26, 31 (describing the increased federalization of corporate law and arguing that the “substance of corporate 
governance standards is appropriately left to the states”); Veasey, supra note 1, at 46 (“Sarbanes-Oxley 
represents a federal incursion into discrete areas of regulation of corporate governance that had been 
traditionally left to the states under the internal affairs doctrine."); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591–92 (2003) (arguing that the potential for federal preemption influences Delaware 
corporate law as much as, or more, than state-to-state competition). 
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effect4 and in the internal affairs doctrine.5 Particularly for non-U.S. students, this 
tradition of state regulation is not obvious. It may even surprise these students that 
federal corporate law is not at the center of the corporate curriculum. 
The other basic building block for this course is understanding the broad federal 
power to regulate the internal affairs of corporations. This type of course provides a 
rare opportunity to address the federal government’s Commerce Clause powers to 
make corporate law, which are normally assumed without discussion or relegated to 
a footnote.6 
Against the backdrop of these limits and traditions, the question is when the 
federal government has exercised this power, as a descriptive matter, and when it 
should do so. The history of federal involvement in corporate law includes 
provisions in recent securities statutes requiring, for instance, independence of 
directors, but the list is more expansive and longstanding.7 It even includes 
recurring — though currently unfashionable — debates over federal chartering of 
corporations. The last step in setting up the problem is to ask when corporate law 
should be federal as a policy matter, and to relate this question to the fundamental 
and longstanding debate over the effect of competition among jurisdictions.8 
Federal corporate law, defined by the source of regulation of corporate 
governance, is a broad category. Moreover, because such federal regulation has not 
been systematic, it potentially covers disparate legal areas as well. These include:  
 4. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors 
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly 
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal 
affairs of the corporation."). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302 (1971); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. 
Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) ("It is now well established that only the law of the state of 
incorporation governs and determines issues relating to a corporation's internal affairs."). 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1622 n.29 (2005) ("There is no plausible constitutional argument that 
Congress would not have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a 
national corporate law."); Roe, supra note 3, at 597 ("[A]ll corporate law could be federal law. This is an obvious 
point, but one that must be borne in mind."). 
 7. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons From History, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2006) (identifying areas of federal regulation of internal affairs). 
 8. Compare Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251, 251–52, 290 (1977) (arguing that state competition for corporate charters “will tend toward 
optimal legal systems” and that state law is “generally preferable to federal”), with Cary, supra note 1, at 705 
(arguing that jurisdictional competition among the states leads to a “race for the bottom” and that, therefore, 
federal regulation of corporations should be expanded). See also Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227–32, 273–81 (1985) (discussing scholarship on 
the federal-state corporate law debate and analyzing Delaware’s competition with other states for corporate 
charters). 
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x Executive compensation9 
x Federal fiduciary duties10 
x Federal corporate criminal liability11 
x Regulation of corporate reorganization (e.g., Williams Act, friendly 
mergers, tax)12 
x Voting rights (proxy access)13 
x Corporate speech14 
x Federal chartering of corporations (including of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac and banks)15 
x Foreign Corrupt Practices Act16 
x Self-Regulatory Organizations’ listing standards17 
 9. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, and the Expanding Role of 
Shareholders in the Governance Process, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 91, 91 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/2011 
/10/compensation/ (discussing federal regulation of executive compensation and the use of compensation 
ratios). 
 10. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1197–1201 (1995) (arguing that violation of state-law 
fiduciary duties should be an element of federal restrictions on insider trading). 
 11. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 25, 
25–26 (2007) (noting federal regulatory responses to corporate misconduct). 
 12. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as Micromanagement, 65 BUS. LAW 789 (2009) (discussing the 
appropriate scope of federal preemption in the context of the Delaware anti-takeover law and the Williams 
Act). 
 13. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (analyzing the history of the SEC’s proposed proxy access rules, which 
were vacated through litigation).  
 14. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Citizens United has not found a 
comfortable home in the corporate curriculum. This course offers one possibility. 
 15. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, The Case for Federal Charterting, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67, 79 
(Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green, eds., 1973); Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317, 324–25 (2009) (discussing how Congress has expanded the scope of 
federal chartering of private business corporations beyond banks and railroads to other entities, such as savings 
associations and credit unions); Roe, supra note 3, at 597 (noting that federal chartering was seriously debated 
in the 1900s, 1910s, 1930s and 1970s). 
 16. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq. (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and 
Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 968–81 (2003). 
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The list of subjects that might be included in federal corporate law reflects the 
broad expanse of federal regulation of internal affairs of business entities (especially 
public corporations) in the United States. Within a law school, focusing on a few of 
these specific areas provides context for thinking through systemic choices about 
the source of regulation.18 Regulation of executive compensation, for instance, is 
addressed by state common law, including the judicially developed duty of loyalty.19 
It also involves securities regulation, including disclosure requirements and 
provisions about say-on-pay.20 Some regulation of executive compensation, 
however, does not fit comfortably into either category. This includes the use of 
settlement review by federal judges as a way to police executive bonuses.21 It also 
includes mechanisms put in place as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which was designed to stabilize financial institutions following the recent 
financial crisis.22 As part of the program, a Special Master for TARP Executive 
Compensation (the “Pay Czar”) was tasked with reviewing executive pay at 
companies that received significant TARP funds.23 These types of federal corporate 
law are not easily captured by the traditional categories. 
Other complex examples are federal fiduciary duties and federal corporate 
criminal liability. Although generally fiduciary duties are rooted in state law,24 
specific federal definitions of fiduciary duties have developed in the case law about 
insider trading25 and in the context of investment advisor and broker-dealer 
fiduciary duties.26 Federal corporate criminal liability might include discussions of 
 18. The University of Illinois “Federal Corporate Law” seminar covered three specific areas: executive 
compensation, federal fiduciary duties and shareholder voting. 
 19. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. 
S'holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (dismissing a complaint alleging that 
directors violated their fiduciary duties by approving a compensation package that encouraged excessive risk-
taking). 
 20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, §§ 951–52, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1899 (2010). 
 21. SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 653 F.Supp.2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting the settlement that 
Bank of America reached with the SEC for allegedly having made false statements about whether bonuses would 
be paid to Merrill Lynch executives); SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 
2010 WL 624581, *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (“while shaking its head,” the court reluctantly approved the 
settlement). 
 22. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–343, tit. I, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767. 
 23. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Symposium on Executive Compensation Keynote Address, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 349 (2011) (detailing the author’s experiences as the TARP special master). 
 24. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (rejecting a judicial interpretation of the 
securities laws that would “overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law”). 
 25. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that, in the context of insider trading, the test 
for breach of fiduciary duty is “whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure"). 
 26. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426–30 (2010) (detailing the fiduciary duties of 
investment advisors); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, tit. IX, § 
913(g), 124 Stat 1376, 1828 (authorizing the establishment of a federal fiduciary duty for brokers and dealers). 
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individual versus corporate liability and sentencing.27 It might also address honest 
services fraud,28 as well as ways governmental civil and criminal actors regulate 
corporate governance through contract, including through deferred prosecution 
agreements and other types of settlement agreements.29 
Finally, business law is in flux, with a new economic context and new regulation 
to address this. One way to accommodate these changes in a law school class is to 
discuss proposed rules or legislation through role playing. For instance, in a 
seminar on federal corporate law, I randomly assigned roles to students: SEC 
commissioner, Business Roundtable member, employee, minority shareholder. 
Students had to advocate for a particular rule or interpretation from their assigned 
perspective. They also drafted federal legislation establishing shareholder proxy 
access, an exercise that forced them to deal with the logistics of developing a new 
rule, including accounting for stricter state laws or contradictory articles of 
incorporation. 
In sum, a course in federal corporate law has the potential to allow explicit 
discussion of the underlying assumptions of corporate law federalism. It pushes 
students to apply these broad theoretical concerns in the context of specific case 
studies. It also paints a complex picture of the changing legal environment for the 
internal affairs of businesses and for the lawyers that advise these businesses. 
 
 27. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1477, 1486 (1995–1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties through Criminal 
Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2010). 
 29. See, e.g., Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159 (2008). 
